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     Japanese Capitalism is very much different from American Capitalism. Worldwide 
surveys conducted between 1986 and 1993 differentiated the Seven Cultures of Capitalism 
and showed large differences between American style capitalism and Japanese style 
capitalism, with the two invariably at opposite poles. The report stated : 
      
All [the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Japan, the Netherlands, 
and Germany] call themselves capitalist and free enterprise nations and subscribe 
generally to the same philosophy, but there the resemblance ends. When we look at the 
day-to-day details, the meaning found in work, the attitude toward stakeholders, the 
styles of managing employees, the various negotiation tactics, the differences are wide, 
as any American who has negotiated a contract with a Japanese will tell you. 1  
 
As for proper goals of a company, they gave us an example.  Forty percent of Americans 
consider the only real goal of a company is making profits, while only 8 % of Japanese agree 
with this view.2  
The principles of Japanese social structure can be seen clearly portrayed in the 
household structure, and the internal structure of the various groups in Japan is vertical.3 
Kaisha  (a company or a corporation) is not an exception. Key characteristics of corporate 
governance in Japan are the lifetime employment mores for larger corporations with the 
seniority system, company-wide labor organizations and the cross-shareholding arrangements 
among corporations that center around main-banks. The Japanese corporate governance 
promoted economic growth but lacks an effective brake, because of the cross-shareholding 
arrangements. This is the big defect of Japanese-style capitalism.  
     The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the behavior and the consciousness of the 
directors, managers and employees of the six big banks and their clients under these 
arrangements after World War? , and show how these banks and their clients were able to 
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execute what they wanted to do (to get bigger shares in the markets rather than their profits) 
without any restraints. It is certain that their behaviors promoted the Japanese economy and 
made Japan the biggest economy next to the U.S.  However, the Japanese economy, has not 
been able to recover from the burst of the bubble on October 1, 1990. To our great regret, the 
two brakes to this practice were Gaiatsu (foreign pressure, chiefly from the U.S.) to amend 
this arrangement and to a larger extent the Sokaiya scandals that had some connections with 
the Yakuza.  
     The cross-shareholding arrangements between big banks and their clients is contrary to 
the principle of the law of the Joint-Stock Companies, but they only came to be regulated in 
the 1981 revision of the Commercial Code. This revision, however, was far from enough. 
Chapter 1 deals with the transition from the dissolution of Zaibatsu  (financial cliques) to the 
Cross-Shareholding Arrangement. Chapter 2 discusses the main characteristics of the 
Japanese management. Chapter 3 clarifies unique characteristics of the enterprise union. 
Chapter 4 states the authority, the privilege and career of management. Chapter 5 shows that 
irresponsibility among the Japanese management is deeply rooted in Japanese culture and 
history and there are few mechanisms to check responsibilities of the management. In 
conclusion, I argue that reforms should aim at realizing the principle expressed in the law 
governing joint-stock companies.   Such reforms must involve : (1) the prohibition of 
shareholding of the corporation by banks ; (2) the prohibition of the voting right of the 
corporation ; (3) an enhancement of the public disclosure of important information on the 
corporation. 
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Chapter 1  
The Transition from the Dissolution of Zaibatsu to the Cross -Shareholding  
Arrangement 
 
1.1 Iron-quadrangle  
To begin with, the structure of control in contemporary Japan is usually called an 
Iron-triangle that consists of politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen who rule Japan. Here, 
bureaucrats are weak against politicians because politicians give the orders or directives to 
bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are strong against businessmen, because bureaucrats give 
Gyoseishido  (administrative guidance) to businessmen and place retired officials in strategic 
positions in the industries they used to regulate (This practice is called Amakudari, literally 
“descent from heaven”). Politicians are strong against bureaucrats, but weak against 
businessmen because businessmen contribute money to have their will reflected in 
government policy. Hence, these three groups are in a mutually dependent relationship. 
Among them, businessmen will produce wealth and powerful businessmen constitute the 
Zaikai (the business community). By the business community is meant “a group from a 
power elite in the economic world which cons ists of large corporations and their managers. 
Through its organizations it reflects its interests in the formation of government policy, and it 
exerts influence over Japanese society as the core of a composite made up of politicians, 
bureaucrats and businessmen.”4  
In reality, the Zaikai was taken to refer to groups such as Keidanren (the Federation of 
Economic Organizations), Nihon Shoko Kaigisho (the Japan Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry), Nikkeiren (the Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations) and Keizai Doyukai 
(Japan Association of Corporate Executives). On May 28, 2002, Keidanren and Nikkeiren 
merged into Nippon Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation) and Mr. Hiroshi Okuda, 
chairman of Nikkeiren and  of Toyota Motor Corporation, was elected as the new chairman. 
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He seems to be the most qualified businessman to head the JBF at this time because he was 
not only an apostle of the Japanese management philosophy, but he also is a passionate 
reformer with a global perspective.5  
As everyone knows, the Zaikai has come to exert a powerful influence over government 
as the representative of the will of total capital. The role of the Zaikai is to exert its influence 
on politics. It participates in the formation of government policy in a variety of forms and 
wields its power in this process. It influences the political parties, and in particular Jimin-to 
(the Liberal Democratic Party, LDP). One important thing to note here is the fact that when 
the LDP was established in 1955 and Nobusuke Kishi (1896-1987) became Secretary-General 
and Prime Minister in 1957, his cellmate at the Sugamo Prison, Yoshio Kodama6 (1911-84) , 
helped him in every possible way. “From that point on over the next decades, Kodama was 
perhaps the most powerful single individual within the LDP.”7 The LDP has been ruling so 
many years except for a few  (Hosokawa, Hata and Murayama’s Administration) since then. 
Acton’s dictum about unmonitored power is entirely true. 
The interests of individual large corporations as well as those of the whole of large 
corporations are reflected in the political process. In return for this, large sums of money in 
the form of Seiji Kenkin  (political donations) are paid. Companies donated a total of ¥3 
billion to political parties in 2000, down from nearly ¥10 billion in annual political donations 
before 1993 when Keidanren stopped arranging them8 which resulted in lesser influence 
upon politicians. In the United States, political contributions by corporations are prohibited 
because it is only electors –  that is, natural persons who can participate in political activity. 
Furthermore, the Zaikai is coordinating and adjusting interests among large corporations, or 
between large corporations and small and medium -sized companies. Thus, the fact that the 
Zaikai performs the role of resolving conflicts of interest among corporations means that the 
power structure of the business community reflects exactly the power relationships among 
corporations. Strong corporations and the groups to which they belong exert power as 
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mainstream factions within the Zaikai. It is the large corporations who wield the greatest 
power within the modern system in Japan. 
 Here, I want to add the media as the fourth power, making an Iron-quadrangle, because 
the media is expected to be critical about the state of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen 
from the standpoint of the people. Their criticism, however, has not been enough. In the 
world of the media, editorship is said to be independent from business that usually depends 
heavily on the revenues from advertisements from corporations. In fact, the independence of 
editorship is not always fully realized. In the Sokaiya scandal, (details of which will be stated 
later), Inoue, chairman, the Dai-Ichi Bank utilized the power of the Sokaiya, Rikiya Kijima 
(1926-1993) who had been close with Kodama in order to be against the merger plan with 
Mitsubishi Bank in 1969, but no media did report this fact. 9 Consequently, the most 
influential are businessmen, especially main bankers. Though a collusive relationship among 
the LDP, bureaucrats, businessmen and the media still exists, this system is being weakened 
in many scandals involving politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen-bankers and the media after 
the bubble burst in 1990. 
Among large corporations it was the six large groups of Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, 
Fuyo, Sanwa and Dai-Ichi Kangyo who were in a dominant position, together with large 
independent corporations such as Shin Nittetsu (the Nippon Steel Corporation), nine Electric 
Powers Corporations, Toyota Motor Corporation and the Industrial Bank of Japan. The 
managers of the corporations in these six large groups and those of a small number of large 
independent corporations made up the mainstream factions within the Zaikai. Mainstream 
factions within the Zaikai were therefore made up of managers of its giant corporations. 
In 2000 companies of the Big Six held about a quarter of the outstanding shares of the 
1892 firms listed on the Tokyo and Osaka stock exchange (Table 1). Moreover, 41.9 % of the 
money lent to these companies came from the financial institutions of the Big Six. In addition, 
of the 5,891 board members who came from outside the respective firms among the listed 
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companies, as many as 52.63% were sent by Big Six group corporations (mostly by their 
financial institutions). Therefore, the six corporate groups combined  held  significant 
weight among the big businesses in Japan. 
1.2 From private capitalism to corporate capitalism  
As corporations got bigger in the post-war period, continuation of family control over 
them became unsustainable. This had not been the case with corporations before the war. The 
primary reason why this changed so much in the post-war period was because of the 
dissolution of the Zaibatsu . Under the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP), the Japanese government designated 83 enterprises as holding companies 
(i.e., companies that hold stocks of other companies) between August 1946 and August 1947. 
In June 1946, ten families designated as Zaibatsu  families gained control of these holding 
companies.10 Although Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Torihiki no Kakuho ni kansuru 
Horitsu11 (the Law concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolies and Maintenance of 
Fair Trade Practices) prohibited holding companie s, each city bank was allowed to hold 5% 
of the stock of any company. Most of the shares of the holding companies and Zaibatsu 
families were transferred to Mochikabukaisha Seiri Iinkai (the Holding Company Liquidation 
Commission). These shares were sold to employees of the respective companies and then to 
the residents of localities where the companies operated. No individual was allowed to 
acquire more than 1% of the stock of any company in this liquidation operation. As a result of 
this policy, holdings by individuals reached 69.1% of all shares outstanding at the end of 
1949. 
At the same time, a substantial number of shares were purchased by securities 
companies and eventually resold to city banks and other companies that belonged to each 
corporate group.  SCAP dissolved the major Zaibatsu families including Mitsui, Iwasaki 
(Mitsubishi), Sumitomo, and Yasuda. Zaibatsu  resolution and a series of other measures 
brought about a number of outstanding achievements (female suffrage was granted: labor 
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unions and radical political parties were rapidly gathering support). But the campaign to 
democratize the Japanese economy came under harsh attack in the American Press.12 The 
core of this group was the American Council on Japan (ACJ)13. On July 3, 1949, SCAP 
ordered Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji to be dissolved. The important thing to note here 
is that it did not dissolve the city banks 14 (namely Teikoku Bank15, Mitsubishi Bank, 
Sumitomo Bank and Yasuda Bank) that existed within each Zaibatsu group, because each 
bank became a main bank around which the cross-shareholding arrangement among 
corporations arose. 
The members of ACJ became in alliance with the old guards 16 in Japan and the 
campaign to democratize the Japanese economy was reversal. A later study notes, “Eventually, 
the former Zaibatsu  enterprises in even-closer alliance with American and multinational 
corporations, not only re -established their pre-war strength but actually augmented their 
shares of both the national and international economies.”17  
In 1953, a 5% ceiling on the holdings of city banks was raised to 10%. In a return to 
the pre-war situation, a substantial portion of the new stocks issued by major companies were 
mutually subscribed by companies related to each other, especially by old Zaibatsu 
connections. As a result, cross-shareholdings more than doubled in six years from 5.6% in 
1949 to 13.2% in 1955.  
On July 1, 1967, the Japanese government decided to liberalize its capital market. 
Japan had become an Article Eight Country of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 
April 1,1964, and a member of the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) on April 28. The Article Eight stipulated that a member country cannot restrict 
current account transactions, and OECD Codes required the liberalization of capital markets. 
Companies that feared hostile takeovers by foreign investors sought to prevent this through 
mutual holdings. In what was called Kabushiki Antei Kosaku  (Stockholding Stabilization 
Operation), shares that had been purchased by the Shoken Hoyu Kumiai (Securities Holding 
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Union) 18 were repurchased by the companies that had issued them and utilized for 
cross-shareholdings. This was done at the insistence of Mr. T. Ishida, chairman of Toyota 
Motor Corporation, whose motto was, “Jibun no shiro wa jibun de mamore (One should 
defend one’s own castle).”19 As a result, holdings by financial institutions reached 30.9% of 
all stocks by the end of 1970. Stockholdings by other business corporations reached 23.1% at 
this time. The management of large Japanese companies thus became insulated from outside 
takeovers. A 10% ceiling on each city bank’s holdings of the stock of any single company 
was lowered to 5% in 1977. 
Consequently, the ties of the Zaibatsu  organizations remained between the related 
firms, and organizational principles rooted in ethnic tradition remained. The post-war six 
business groups, especially the former Zaibatsu, had the following common characteristics : 
First of all, in principle each group tries to maintain one and only one company in any type of 
business (so called the “one set principle”). Second, there are Shacho -Kai20 (President ’s 
clubs) at the core of each group where periodic exchange of information and, occasionally, 
decision making among member businesses occurred. Third, member firms maintained a 
considerable level of mutual long-term inter-corporate holdings of stocks (stable 
cross-shareholdings) to prevent hostile takeover bids by both foreign and domestic outsiders. 
Fourth, there was a large city bank (Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui, Fuji, Sanwa and DKB) 
which was called a main bank operated at the center of each group, providing short-and 
long-term loans for member firms under slightly advantageous conditions, and in many cases 
was involved in the selection of companies’ directors and auditors. Fifth, Sogo Shosha (a 
general trading company : Mitsubishi Shoji, Sumitomo Shoji, Mitsui Bussan, Marubeni, 
Nissho-Iwai and C. Itoh respectively) at the core of each group engaged in information 
exchange between both buyers and sellers.  
The concentration of the cross-shareholding arrangement among six business groups is 
shown in Table 2. Mitsubishi has the highest ratio of interlocking shares. In other words, 
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about 30% of the total shares of an average Mitsubishi firm are owned by other Mitsubishi 
firms. Recently however, in confronting with foreign competitors, Mitsui and Sumitomo 
merged into MSBC on April 1, 2001. Tokyo Mitsubishi, Mitsubishi Trust and Nippon Trust 
established Mitsubishi Financial Group and Sanwa, Tokai and Chuo Trust established UFJ 
Holdings on April 2, 2001 respectively. Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Fuji and the Industrial Bank of 
Japan established Mizuho Holdings on April 1, 2002. Big changes have occurred that was 
unthinkable a decade ago.  
 
Chapter 2  
Managers and Shareholders  
 
2.1 The main characteristics of the top management in Japan  
     According to Akihiro Okumura’s Nippon No Top Management, based upon the survey 
between Matsushita Denki Sangyo (Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.) and RCA, he  
noted the following characteristics: 
(1)  The proportion of outside directorships in the U.S. is substantial, whereas in Japan it 
is few. 
(2) In the U.S., policymaking decisions are made in the boardroom, while operations are 
made by the executive officers. The two roles are fully separated. In Japan, the directors 
usually have management functions in addition to their policymaking positions [general 
manager of a specific division] and the two roles are not fully separated. 
(3) In Japan, directors hold their own positions within the company whereas in the U.S. 
they seldom hold any.  
(4) The size of the board of directors [by numbers of members] is larger in Japan.  
(5) In Japan, the board of directors evolves into the following hierarchy – chairman, 
president, managing directors, executive directors, general directors. In the U.S., on the 
other hand, the director (chairman of the board) is the only member of the board with a 
distinct rank while the others are at least nominally equal. On the management side, 
though, the ranking follows from the chairman of the board, the president (CEO), chief 
operations vice president, vice presidents, and so on.21  
In short, in Japan, first, policymaking and operations are inseparable, and second, 
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directors do double roles (a policymaking role as well as an operating role) as managers. 
These two reasons make outside directors rare in Japan. Whereas in the U.S., directors take 
charge of a trusteeship management function and decide overall corporations management 
policies by being entrusted by shareholders. The execution of these policies is the 
responsibility of the executive officer or the chief executive officer. In this the performance of 
the executive and the directorship can be evaluated separately.  
In 1950 Commercial Law reforms separated between decision-making bodies and 
executives bodies to be more like those in US. Under this reform, the board of directors was 
made the supreme decision-making body with regard to corporate policy, whereas executives 
were named to represent the board in the daily operations of the corporation; however, this 
was not the case in reality. In truth, the provisions of the Commercial Code stipulated that 
representative directors were to execute corporation policy in accordance with the decisions 
of the board. As representative directors, doubling as executives, assumed the highest 
positions on the board, it is impossible for the board to direct and control them. Boards in 
Japanese companies have vertical, hierarchical orders based on the seniority system so the 
representative directors who are the highest, are also the oldest.  
In this way, the policymaking directors and executives in Japan are not separated from 
each other. Professor Hiroshi Okumura states:  
Matters that concern day-to-day operations find their way into the boardroom. This 
ultimately precludes the consideration of issues pertaining to corporate strategy and 
keeps the board from taking an industry-wide viewpoint in policy-making, preferring 
instead to direct the corporation with a narrow, inward-looking viewpoint. In the end, 
this system puts policy-making and execution on the shoulders of the same people, so 





2.2 Relationship with shareholders  
 12 
In the United States, executive and policymaking functions are separated from each 
other and many of the policymakers on the board of directors are appointed from the outside. 
We can assume that the board has been entrusted by shareholders to manage the company,  
which is called trustee management. The aim of U.S. corporations is known to increase 
Return On Investment (ROI) and Price Earning Ratio (P/E Ratio) because the shareholders 
have power over management. Those executives who have not been successful in realizing 
this aim are often fired by the decisions of the outside directors.  
In Japan, the fact that the management is not influenced by outside shareholders 
implies that: (1) the cross-shareholding arrangement exists between main banks and their 
clients corporations, details of which will be described later; (2) almost  all of the 
corporate -shareholders prefer a stable relationship to return or profitably on their holdings. 
Large corporate shareholders issue each other blank letters of attorney for each of their 
shareholders’ meetings. If a corporation does not issue such a letter, the shareholder meeting 
cannot proceed; when this happens, corporation cannot manage. Without a majority decision 
from the shareholders’ meeting, the directors must resign. But in fact this does not happen 
and the shareholders’ meeting is held every settlement term. And the proposals of the 
corporation nearly always pass because the corporation possesses the letter of attorney, or if 
present, hand in an agreement on the corporation’s proposals. In this way the corporate 
shareholders build mutual trust and create the Japanese style of top management structure. It 
is certain that the historical relationship with management cannot be ignored, but the mutual 
trust built among large corporate shareholders has become a very important factor. 
 
2.3 Managers and share prices  
     It is commonly known that in terms of long term planning the Japanese management is 
better than U.S. management because the latter tends to place too much emphasis on the 
short-term indicators such as ROI and P/E Ratio above -mentioned. For example, in 1981, the 
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Economic White Paper stated the following: Japanese firms use such long term growth 
indicators as market share and development of new product output.23 This statement is 
correct but omitted a very important fact. The Japanese management usually thinks highly of 
the share prices of their own as well as those they have as collateral for their financing and 
the common stocks issuing at the current market prices. 
     Previously, companies had issued common stock at its  par value. In 1969, however, 
Yamaha Corporation, then known as Nihon Gakki, followed the U.S. practice and issued 
common stock at the current market price. Other corporations soon followed suit so that they, 
too, could raise more money. Because of the prevalence of cross -shareholding, few floating 
shares (shares not held by stable shareholders) are traded in the stock market in Japan. 
Cross-shareholdings among corporations listed on the stock market have accounted for 
between 52.2 and 60% of the value of the stock of Japanese corporations since the start of the 
1980’s.24 Moreover, the stock market was dominated by Big Four 25 securities houses: 
Nomura, Nikko, Daiwa, and Yamaichi. The power of Nomura was pa rticularly great, so when 
Nomura buys shares of a corporation in collaboration with Nomura’s Keiretsu securities 
houses, the price of that stock invaluably rose. 
     Under these circumstances, it was common practice for Nomura to persuade a 
corporation to issue common stock at its current market price or convertible bonds (CB) 
overseas. It also urged its Keiretsu  corporations to hold shares in the corporation so that every 
party would benefit from the higher price of the stock. This practice contributed further to 
cross-shareholdings, especially among financial Keiretsu  during the late 1980s resulted in the 
booming economy in Japan. The capital-adequacy requirements for banks doing international 
business that introduced at the Basle Committee on July 15, 198826 under which the 
Japanese banks are allowed to count up to 45% of fukumi (the unrealized gain) on securities 
and other equities as part of base capital in calculating 8% ratio was also of help to the 
Japanese banks to extend loans overseas so long as the stock market prices are on the upward 
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trend.  
     During the stock and urban real-estate bubbles of the late 1980s, many banks except 
Mitsubishi Bank approached the real estate companies that were often related with the 
Yakuza and lent them money to acquire the land upon which they had planned to build 
gorgeous apartments to sell or to rent. After the bubble burst on October 1, 1990, it became 
very difficult for banks to be paid back from the Yakuza. Some say that the present recession 
is the Yakuza recession. 27  
 
Chapter 3  
Managers and Employees  
 
3.1 Unique characteristics of the enterprise union  
     As already mentioned in the Introduction, the notion of the corporation, as a form of a 
vertical, hierarchically-ordered family has its roots deep in Japanese culture and was 
consciously utilized by Japanese managers to win the loyalty of employees in the volatile 
labor market of the early period of industrialization (1890-1930). The systems established are 
Shushin Koyo (the life-time employment mores) for larger corporations, which offered 
employees the security of a job  for life, and Nenko Joretsu (the seniority system), which 
linked promotion and fringe benefits to age and length of service. The practice of hiring 
employees immediately after graduation from school or university, which began before World 
War? , became particularly entrenched in the post-war period. All these factors tended to 
restrict labor mobility and encourage the development of closed employment systems. Nearly 
all Japanese labor unions are organized on a company basis as opposed to on an industry 
basis. This was chiefly attributable to Takashi Sakurada (1904-85)28, president and chairman 
of Nisshinbo Industries who helped create Nikkeiren and served as its executive director and 
permanent executive secretary, as well as its chairman from 1974 to 1979. All workers in the 
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corporation, both white and blue collar, are organized in the same union. All belong to the 
workplace branch of their union. Collective bargaining negotiations are wide ranging and 
usually result in a yearly agreement on pay and working conditions that is negotiated as 
Shunto  (spring offensive). At Shunto  management supplies the union with a great deal of 
information that is passed on to the members. Such collective bargaining negotiations are, in 
effect, a joint labor-management conference. When a Japanese company is in deep trouble, it 
can cut its part-time employees, because there are no contracts with the union against 
reducing this part of labor. The next step is to limit bonus payments. This is followed by an 
attempt to reduce wages.29  
The relationship between managers and employees cannot be explained in contractual 
terms. Managers do not employ only a man’s labor itself but really employ the whole man. 
There are a number of well-known features peculiar to the Japanese employment system. 30  
Then, labor unions show concern for the company’s needs. Japanese employees have been 
less prone to strike than U.S. unionists. Professor Lipset states, “American unions have been 
reluctant to cooperate with executives on management problems or to take responsibility for 
corporate welfare.”31 Thus in 1980, one million work days were lost to strikes in Japan, as 
compared to almost 21 million in the United States. By 1991, the Japanese figure had fallen 
to 96,000, while the American was close to 4.6 million.32 In Japan, the labor unions are often 
called Goyo Kumiai (unions for companies). Cases where labor union members move up to 
the board of directors or to the audit committee and from there, eventually reach CEO, are not 
at all unusual. According to the Nikkeiren report, roughly one in six of all the major posts of 
the companies have experienced union members assuming top executive positions (as of 
1983). In Japan, joining the union can be thought of as a way of getting promoted in the 
company because the company wants to have managers who can control the union. As 
already mentioned, a Japanese corporation is of vertical character. Competition was made not 
between capital and labor but rather between other corporations within the same industries. 
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These competitions among them are keen and they are trying to get more share of the markets. 
Thus, within a corporation the management and labor have to be cooperative, because if they 
were on strike, they would lose in competition.  
     These systems, however, have recently encountered new challenges. Banks’ efforts to 
clear up their non-performing loans, details of which will be stated later, pushed weak 
borrowers into bankruptcy, resulting in more job losses. Major companies in the IT industry  
suffered a sudden slowdown in 2001. For example, Matsushita Electric Company made it 
clear to change the life-time employment mores and reduce 5,000 employees by paying 
additional payment to the retirement allowance for the earlier retirees after they had recorded 
the red in the operating profit in the September term of 2001. 33 The attitude or loyalty of the 
employees toward the corporations also changed. One survey34 made in January 2001 by 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun showed that 45% of all employees preferred to change their jobs if 
possible and its rate among the younger employees was nearly 70%.  Employers and labor 
unions floated the idea of introducing job-sharing programs because the unemployment rate, 
tracked by the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications 
topped 5.2% last year for the first time since 1953, when data -keeping began.  
3.2 Relative lack of outside directors  
     Outside directors were not rare in the pre-war Japan. Viscount Shibusawa (1840-1931), 
the founder of the Dai-Ichi Kokuritsu Ginko (predecessor of the Dai-Ichi Bank) and one of 
the founders of Shoho Koshujo (now Hitotsubashi University) was an excellent example. 35 
But this tradition had been lost during the war.  
     The majority of directors in a typical Japanese corporation are current or former 
employees of the company. One survey36 of nearly 2,000 large Japanese firms conducted in 
1990 found that roughly 91% were company men. Employees of larger corporations 
traditionally spend their entire career with the company, rising through the ranks to 
management positions primarily according to the lifetime employment mores and the 
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seniority system. More talented individuals who are well-liked by the president (details of 
which will be mentioned later) will be appointed to directorships, while they often retain 
day-to-day responsibilities for running the company as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
     So though many directors in Japan come from parent companies or affiliated banks, 
there is no denying that, in comparison with America, a great number of directors are 
promoted from within. Independent shareholders - no matter how large a stake they have in 
the company - are rarely found on the board of directors. 
 
Chapter 4  
The Authority, the Privilege and Career of Management  
 
4.1 The ground on which managerial authority relies  
     As mentioned already, managers are neither the representatives of shareholders nor the 
representatives of workers. It is  managerial control based on corporate shareholders. It is not 
simply “ownership control” but control by natural persons due to ownership of corporations. 
Originally a manager was a company’s representative and served as an agency. This role 
started when companies gained status as corporations. With corporations, shareholders put up 
the funds to establish a company. And yet, the company owns the company’s assets. 
     One attempt to explain this arrangement has been advanced by Professor Okumura. “If 
the company accumulates a part of profits within it as a reserve fund, the owners of the assets 
are not shareholders but the company itself.”37 Thus the notion has gone from the notion that 
“everything which belongs to the company belongs to the shareholders” to the notion that 
“the company stands on its own.” With the company owning company shares, the idea of the 
ownership by the company itself becomes clearer. In the case of a one-way ownership by a 
company of shares in another company, one can say that the assets of one company are 
owned by big shareholders of that company. But Professor Okumura explains further: in the 
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case of mutual ownerships of shares of these companies, it is impossible to determine the 
ultimate owner of the assets of these companies.  If a corporation buys shares in another 
corporation, the fictitious person theory must search for natural persons as the shareholders of 
the company. This kind of traceability of ownership to a natural person is not obtained in the 
case of mutual ownership of shares, as it is not so in Japan. 38 Control is not arisen from the 
ownership by natural persons but is exercised by managers on the basis of ownership by legal 
persons. This is a pivotal point. 
4.2 Who selects management?  
     Managers in most companies in Japan start as employees under the lifetime 
employment mores and seniority system already mentioned. They are given on-the-job 
training. They climb the ladder one by one within banks or their client-corporations. Finally 
they approach the stage where they are either selected as directors or auditors or sent to their 
affiliated companies. According to the Commercial Law, directors and auditors are appointed 
at the general shareholders’ meeting. But the meeting is done mostly in accordance with 
letters of proxy passed among the various corporate shareholders, and the candidates favored 
by the company are the ones who gain the positions. The shareholders’ meeting is a ceremony 
for candidates that the company has pre-selected for the various positions. 
     Accordingly, the person who selects the members of the board or the auditors is the 
president and this nomination is automatically approved at the general meeting of 
shareholders. It is very natural that the president does not recommend those who do not trust 
him as the members of the board but select only those who support him as the president. In 
effect, the president elects himself. Frankly speaking, those who curry favor with the 
president tend to be selected as a candidate for a director or an auditor. Apple polishers will 
be in a better position to be selected. It often happens that the president will be chairman, 
honorary chairman and counselor successively and clings to his bank or company until his 
death as in the case of Kaoru Inoue, a Tenno  at the DKB, details of which will be stated later. 
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     Then the president seems to be omnipotent but the important point is that with 
worsening corporate performance, the president could be forced to quit by the main bank or 
by a large shareholders. It is true that large corporations that have cross-shareholdings in each 
other reach mutual understandings on performance and have a system of mutual trust and 
control. 
4.3 Who becomes manager?  
     Most of the directors of a given company in Japan are recruited from the ranks of that 
company’s employees who climbed up the ladder one by one under the lifetime employment 
mores and the seniority system already mentioned. After World War? , the initial salary39 is 
same irrespective of universities they are graduating from. The top management positions, 
however, are not open to all universities graduates but limited a few prestigious universities. 
There are usually Gakubatsu (school cliques) in each large bank or company. For example, 
the top management of the Dai-Ichi Bank, the oldest commercial bank in Japan, consisted of 
mostly graduates of the University of Tokyo, law or economics department and a few 
graduates of Hitotsubashi University, economics or commerce department. 
     Dramatic changes happened in both the business and education world after World War
? . As has been already mentioned, the Zaibatsu were dissolved. The education system also 
changed. The GHQ abolished the system under which imperial universities had been treated 
differently financially from ordinary state universities. Under the new regulation imperial 
universities were transferred into ordinary state universities. As military academies had all 
been closed, universities were the only means of climbing the social ladder in the secular 
world, so that the r at race for obtaining a place in a state university was intense in post-war 
Japan because several state universities are old in tradition and prestigious, and yet their 
tuitions are comparatively cheap with those of private universities. Those who had been 
unsuccessful in the race were obliged to enter private universities. In fact some such as Keio 
and Waseda Universities are considered better than some state universities. 
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     Professor Micho Morishima of London School of Economics classifies the universities 
in contemporary Japan to show which university graduates are most likely to become the top 
management among the Six Enterprise Groups. He divides universities into the following 
categories : (1) the University of Tokyo, (2) the University of Kyoto, (3) Hitotsubashi-Tokyo 
Institute of Technology, (4) major state Universities, (5) other national and municipal 
universities, (6) Keio and Waseda Universities, and (7) other private universities. (1) and (2) 
are ex-imperial universities in Tokyo and Kyoto res pectively. In (3) Hitotsubashi is the 
former Tokyo University of Commerce now specializing in economics and other social 
sciences, while TIT (Tokyo Institute of Technology) is the former college of technology 
located in Tokyo. Category (4) includes five former imperial universities (Tohoku, Kyushu, 
Hokkaido, Osaka and Nagoya) and Kobe, this last one being a comprehensive university, 
established after World War?  on the basis of Kobe Commercial High School with other 
institutions. The universities in category (5) are influential in their respective localities but 
have not yet established a nation wide reputation. Among private universities most eminent 
are Keio and Waseda listed in (6): in terms of numbers of students, the latter is much larger, 
and although Waseda is more powerful in political world and journalism, it is far less 
influential than Keio as far as the business world is concerned because traditionally, graduates 
of Waseda tend to go into the world of journalism rather than the business world. Category 
(7) includes giant private universities such as Nippon, Kinki and Fukuoka, as well as more 
moderate universities in size such as Meiji, Rikkyo and Doshisha, etc. with some historical 
reputations. He pointed out educational backgrounds of presidents and chairman of the Six 
Enterprise Groups in 199240, which is self-evident (Table 3). 
     The cross-shareholding arrangement has been stable over a long period. One of factors 
that determine Shafu (the color of character) of a bank or a company would be the  
composition of the universities from which its chairman, its president and executives have 
graduated. Needless to say, relations developed by having attended the same prestigious 
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university contribute to the smooth, effective, and informal exchange of information. This 
factor supports mutual confidence based upon the cross-shareholding arrangement between 
city banks and other companies that belonged to each group. 
 
Chapter 5  
Irresponsibility of the Top Management 
 
5.1 Irresponsibility among the Japanese management  
     Irresponsibility among the Japanese management is deeply rooted in Japanese culture 
and history. The title Tenno  (Emperor) was first used by Japanese rulers in the 6th or 7th 
century and has been used by all subsequent Japanese sovereigns. The Emperor has almost 
always been regarded as the titular head of the national government. Yet, the most 
characteristic feature of the office through most of Japanese history has been the tendency to 
emphasize the Emperor ’s role as chief priest in Shinto  (the indigenous Japanese religion) and 
to delegate most of the effective powers of government to others.  
Kinnoka (imperial loyalists) stressed the centrality of the imperial house within the 
Japanese polity in the mid-19th century, when Japan encountered with Western pressure to 
open Japan to foreign trade and diplomacy. This upsurge which was called Sonno Joi (revere 
the Emperor, expel the Barbarians) proved a key factor in the toppling of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate and the initiation of the Meiji Restoration of 1868. With the promulgation of the 
constitution of the Empire of Japan on February 11, 1889, the Emperor became a 
constitutional monarch in a centralized and unitary state that was to exercise greater political 
power than any previous form of government in Japan’s history.  
     According to the constitution, the Emperor was “sacred and inviolable”, and 
sovereignty rested with him as the head of the Japanese Empire. From the very start of the 
Asia -Pacific War, Emperor Hirohito had been positive and aggressive. It is very clear that 
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Emperor Hirohito was responsible for World War 41, because he declared the War in his name 
and many Japanese had been drafted and invaded China and Southeast Asian Countries. 
     After the surrender to the Allied Powers on August 15, 1945, the government of 
Australia and the USSR tried to accuse Hirohito as a war criminal. The United States, 
however, had decided not to accuse Hirohito as a war criminal and wanted to make use of 
Hirohito in controlling Japan and make Japan the ally in the cold war against the USSR. 
Hirohito and his five associates prepared the documents to protect him from the accusations 
in collaboration with the SCAP.42 As a result of their efforts, Hirohito’s name was not 
included among war criminals. On December 16, 1945, Fumimaro Konoe (former Prime 
Minister, three times) committed suicide before being arrested.43 Hirohito made a statement 
in the New Year’s rescript of January 1, 1946 in which Hirohito explicitly denied his own 
divinity upon the request of General MacArthur. He became the symbol of the state and the 
unity of the people under the new constitution promulgated on November 3, 1946. Hirohito 
did not acknowledge publicly his own moral, political accountability for the war fought in his 
name.  
     Seven Japanese including one civilian were found guilty and sentenced to death by 
hanging on December 23 (Hirohito’s son, Akihito’s birthday), 1948. On returning to Tokyo 
from his first visit to the United States, Hirohito was interviewed on television on October 31, 
1975. A Japanese newsman asked an important question: “Does your Majesty feel 
responsibility for the war itself, including the opening of hostility? Also, what does Your 
Majesty think about so-called war responsibility? ” Hirohito’s face stiffened a little, and he 
answered : “I cannot answer that kind of question because I have not thoroughly studied the 
literature in this field, and so do not really appreciate the nuances of your words.”44 
Hirohito’s pretense of ignorance, as if he had been an innocent bystander to the event of his 
reign, angered professional historians. 
     The fact that Emperor Hirohito did not admit the crime and made no imperial 
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repentance until his death on January 7, 1989 and the fact that those second in command were 
made responsible seems to have pervaded deeply into the consciousness of the Japanese. 
There is an Emperor in each bank and each company. No one within dares to be critical about 
him.  
     In Japan individualism has not developed enough and the Japanese are thinking highly 
of the groups such as the family and the company to which they belong. Max Weber in his 
“Politics as a Vocation,” stated that all ethically oriented conduct may be guided by one of 
two fundamentally different and irreconcilably opposed maxims: conduct can be oriented to 
an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ or to an ‘ethic of responsibility’ and points out that ‘there is an 
abysmal contrast between conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of ultimate ends – that 
is, in religious terms, ‘The Christian does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord’ –  and 
conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of responsibility, in which case one has to give an 
account of the foreseeable results of one’s action.’45  
     One’s own responsibility comes from the notion of individualism and one ’s 
responsibility toward the society comes from the notion of functions of work. To our great 
regret, the majority of the Japanese management influenced by the mental climate just 
mentioned above has neither the notion of individualism nor the notion of functions of work. 
Accordingly, irresponsible management arises here. Thus there must be some institutional 
measures to check this trend. To our regret, however, there have not been powerful 
institutional measures to check except derivative lawsuit recently introduced after the 
Structural Impediment Initiative talks in 1989-90. 
 
5.2 Lack of institutional measures to pursue responsibility of managers 
Weak outside directors on the board  
     Since October 1992, large firms (those wit h capital of at least ¥500 million or total 
liabilities of ¥20 billion) have been required to appoint a three -member audit committee, 
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including one outside auditor, defined as a person who has not been a director, manager, or 
employee of the company or one of its subsidiaries for five years prior to his or her 
appointment. The terms of auditors were also lengthened from two years to three. While there 
is currently no legal requirement for Japanese corporations to have a minimum number of 
outside directors, a growing number of companies are increasing the number of outside 
directors. According to the results of a survey conducted by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun 46, Of 
the respondents, 42.3% have appointed outside directors, while 10.5% are considering 
nominating such directors in or after the next fiscal year. However, 48.1% of these companies 
have only one outside director and 34% have two. This is very much different from the 
system of corporate governance in the U.S. where outside directors account for a majorit y of 
the board. 
Access to corporate information 
     Under the Commercial Code, the Securities and Exchange Law, and other statutes, 
Japanese corporations are requested to regularly and publicly disclose basic financial 
information, including the company balance sheet and profit and loss statement. These rules 
have been less burdensome, and less revealing of actual corporate performance, than those of 
the United States. In particular, disclosure of segmented information of sales and earnings 
and disclosure of related- party transactions have been limited. But recent annual reports by 
leading Japanese companies have begun to show the information above mentioned shown by 
the annual report of Teijin Ltd. that won the best prize among the 53 listed companies on the 
4th Nikkei Annual Report Awards (Nihon Keizai Shimbun , February 5, 2002). Under revisions 
to the Commercial Code implemented in October 1993, the stock ownership threshold 
enabling a shareholder to have unrestricted access to the company books was lowered from 
10% to 3%. Yet this still excludes most individual shareholders. 
Derivative lawsuits 
     Under revisions to the Commercial Code implemented in October 1993, the cost of 
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filing derivative lawsuits were substantially reduced through a lowering of the stamp duty to 
a uniform ¥8,200 and introduction of a requirement that the company pay most legal fees if 
the shareholders win the suit. Prior to 1993 the Ministry of Justice estimates47 that an 
average of about ten new derivative lawsuits were filed annually. For calendar year 1993, the 
Ministry puts the figure at 30, of which 23 were filed in the last quarter of year. Judging from 
the sharp increase in the number of derivative lawsuits since October 1993, the amendments 
in this area appear to have already had an impact on shareholders’ exercise of their rights. 
     An annual survey48 by Nissei Kiso Kenkyujo shows that cross -shareholdings among 
six enterprise groups which had accounted for 12.10% from 1987 to 7.47% in 2000 (Unit: 
amounts of the value of stock). Within each group, Mitsubishi group of firms that belong to 
Kinyokai, the ratio from 14.79% to 11.27%, Sumitomo group of firms (Hakusuikai), from 
13.36% to 8.87%, DKB group of firms (Sankinkai), from 9.14% to 6.24%, Mitsui group of 
firms (Nimokukai), from 10.16% to 5.09%, Fuji group of firms (Fuyokai), from 11.16% to 
4.60% and Sanwa group of firms (Sansuikai) from 9.35% to 4.90% respectively (Unit: 
amounts of the value of stock). There is certainly a declining trend. Furthermore, since 
Japanese banks have been requested to restrict bank shareholdings to the level which is equal 
to their Tier one capital by September, 2004. Consequently, unwinding of cross-shareholdings 
will be accelerated further. But cross-shareholdings will remain. According to one survey,49 
only 2.3% of the subjects answered that they wanted to dissolve cross-shareholdings and 
40.9% of the subjects answered that their object of cross-shareholdings was the stability of 
their stocks. This is the cross-shareholding arrangement characteristic of Japan and is a defect 
of Japanese style capitalism.  
5.3 Cross-shareholding in theory 
     As early as 1961, Professor Kenichiro Osumi claimed the fact that cross-shareholdings 
were against the principle of the Joint-stock Company. 50 The ownership of shares in a 
company by another company renders possible what is known as Shoken daii (securities 
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subrogation). Take the following: there is a company A with a capital of one hundred million 
yen. If we also suppose that company B owns 51% of the equity capital of company A and 
further suppose that company C owns 51% of the equity of company B, the majority 
shareholder of the equity shares of company C can, by virtue of this fact, control both 
company A and company B. The rights as shareholders of those who own shares in company 
A and B are thus impaired. Through the owning of the shares of a company by another 
company, the rights of the shareholders who were the original investors in the company are 
invaded. This is a pivotal point, but this view has not been given serious considerations. 
Professor Osumi notes that when he wrote his paper he had no intention of proposing the 
revision of the Commercial Code because the ratio of cross -shareholding among the total 
shares issued was considered to be relatively low. But as we already mentioned, after World 
War?  the cross-shareholding arrangement among the big six enterprise groups has begun 
and enhanced, especially after 1970 (Table 2). This is the situation of which Professor Osumi 
was afraid. In fact, the Commercial Code Article 241.3 amended by Law No. 74 on June 9, 
1981 stipulates: 
      
In the case where a company, a parental company and affiliated company, or an 
affiliated company is in possession of the shares exceeding one-fourth of the whole 
number of the issued shares of another Kabushiki- Kaisha, or the Units of contribution 
exceeding one-fourth of the capital of another private company, the said Kabushiki- 
Kaisha or the said private company does not have the voting right in respect of the 
shares of the company of or the parental company thus in possession. 
 
But the case of the possession of the share exceeding one -fourth of the whole number of the 
issued shares of another Kabushiki-Kaisha is rare, so in effect this law has no force. 
Accordingly, the rationale of allowing corporations to have voting rights in other corporations 
of which they own shares should be questioned. Professor F. A. Hayek states in his The 
Corporation in a Democratic Society : In Whose Interest Ought It To and Will It Be Run?, “I 
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have never quite understood the rationale or justification of allowing corporations to have 
voting rights in other corporations of which they own shares.”51 In fact, he notes, “This was 
never deliberately decided upon in full awareness of all its applications, but came about 
simply as a result of the conception that, if legal personality was conferred upon the 
corporation, it was natural to confer upon it all powers which natural persons possessed.”52 
According to him: 
      
a group which directly owns assets amount only to a small fraction of those of the 
corporation, may, through a pyramiding of holdings, acquire control of assets 
amounting to a multiple of what they own themselves. By owning a controlling 
interest in a corporation which owns a controlling interest in another corporation and 
so on, a comparatively small amount owned by a person or group may control a very 
much bigger aggregation of capital. --- such stock so long as it [stock] is owned by 
another corporation, should cease to confer a right to vote.53  
 
It seems to me that the view expressed by F. A. Hayek is adequate and this should apply to 
the present situation of the cross-shareholding arrangement. To our great regret, almost all 
Japanese scholars except Professor Hiroshi Okumura54 pay no attention to this. On the 
contrary, the government revised the Anti-Monopoly Law of 1947 and the ban was lifted in 
1997 to make Japanese companies more competitive globally. Daiei Inc. became the first firm 
to set up a holding company. Recently, large city banks that had been in trouble from the 
burst of the bubble created companies such as Mizuho Holdings and UFJ to merge beyond 
the Keiretsu . Such being the case, it is only Sokaiya  (a kind of racketeers) who scare the 
corporation by revealing information that is unwelcome and dangerous to the management of 
the corporation. 
5.4 Sokaiya  and the DKB 
     Sokaiya  means literally “shareholders ’ meeting men” but the Sokaiya gangs have been 
described in English as “financial racketeers,” “general meeting mongers,” and 
“extortionists.” David Kaplan and Alec Dubro explain about their activities by saying: 
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     Typically, the groups operate by buying several shares of a company’s stock, digging 
up scandalous information, and then demanding hush money. They ferret out 
embarrassing facts about the company’s top management : high-ranking officials who 
cheat on their income tax, ignore safety rules in their plants, or keep mistresses. If the 
corporation refuses to pay up, at its next general meeting the Sokaiya  will appear 
armed with these unpleasant revelations and loudly berate the company management. 
The executives, highly concerned over losing face before their employees and the 
public, have traditionally anted up. 55  
 
     Yoshio Kodama, a powerful behind-the-scenes manipulator is said to have 
systematically advanced into Sokaiya circle after 1965 and had remained the leading boss of 
the Sokaiya  world until his death in 1984. The Sokaiya  is less popular than Yakuza . His 
victims are the large and respected corporations. The emergence of these extortionists was 
possible because of the gap between the formal reality and the substantial reality in the 
business world. Since Japanese corporations officially have shareholders, shareholders ’ 
meetings are necessary so as not to disrupt this formal reality. In actual reality, as already 
mentioned, the joint-stock companies which belong to big six enterprise groups hold shares 
of other companies within the groups and have never had any intention of giving shareholders 
outside the directorates of their own corporate groups a voice of any kind. At their peak in 
1981, a police survey revealed 6,800 Sokaiya in 500 separate groups extorting as much as 
$400 million annually.56 At the end of 1996, a police survey showed there were 35 groups of 
Sokaiya, amounting to about 1,000 including operators.57  
     As mentioned already, the president of a large Japanese bank and a company lord it 
over like an emperor, so many large firms created a specialized staff within their general 
affairs department for Sokaiya affairs and almost always ended by paying up. If they failed to 
pay enough, presidents were grilled for hours at their annual stockholders’ meetings. If 
adequately paid, however, they would follow the unwritten rule of iginashi (no objections) at 
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these ritual meetings. A 1982 amendment to the Commercial Code made Sokaiya practices 
illegal in theory, but this was no consolation for the majority of victims. This parasitic 
phenomenon is not without benefit because the Sokaiya refrain from exploiting the more 
vulnerable segments of society, and the corporations try to reduce the amount of dirt that the 
Sokaiya dig up by keeping their practices more honest.  
     In the case of the Dai-Ichi Bank, Kaoru Inoue (1906-93), chairman was against the plan 
by Juzaburo Hasegawa (1908-85), president, a son of Eiichi Shibusawa, the founder of the 
bank, to merge with Mitsubishi Bank. Inoue led the movements against the merger by himself 
by making use of Rikiya Kijima who was a powerful Sokaiya  and close with Yoshio Kodama, 
immediately after Yomiuri Shimbun had reported this news on January 1, 1969. 58 Inoue often 
mentioned that he was for the merger in general. He said, however, that he was against this 
merger, because Mitsubishi Bank (capital : 36 billion yen, deposits ranking: third) will absorb 
the smaller Dai-Ichi Bank (capital : 24 billion yen, deposits ranking : sixth). He should not 
have utilized Kijima’s power. This left Inoue obligated to Kijima and later almost brought the 
DKB into collapse. Chairman Tetsuo Fujimori (1919- ), (University of Tohoku graduate) 
selected Kuniji Miyazaki (1930-97), (University of Kyushu graduate) instead of Tatsuo Aoki 
(1928- ), (University of Tokyo graduate) who had been considered to succeed Fujimori. 
Fujimori explained that Miyazaki was suitable for the merged bank, the DKB. As already 
mentioned, the top management of the Dai-Ichi Bank consisted of graduates of the University 
of Tokyo or Hitotsubashi University. Miyazaki and Fujimori would have not been selected as 
a president and a chairman without the merger with the Nippon Kangyo Bank in 1971. 
Fujimori thought too much of Wa (harmony) and he did not consider other factors necessary 
for the top management. Konosuke Matsushita, a leading capitalist in Japan once remarked 
“In selecting the top management in a first-rate company, I believe we should prioritize a man 
of higher ethic.”59 It was true that Miyazaki was well liked by almost everybody. Miyazaki 
entered the Osaka branch in 1952 and became a deputy-general manager of Kobe branch, 
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then the secretary to “Emperor” Inoue. This position catapulted him to presidency. Miyazaki 
became acquainted with Kijima while he was the secretary.  
     After Kijima died in 1993, Ryuichi Koike (1943- ), a Sokaiya, a disciple of Kijima 
aske d the DKB to lend him money. This was the chance for the DKB to reject the loan. The 
DKB, however, lent him money without enough collateral. No one was against this loan. The 
total amount to 46 billion yen which is unbelievable. Miyazaki committed suicide on June 29, 
1997 just before being arrested. Shin Sadaka, a social critic who read “Why did the chairman 
commit suicide?” commented frankly that “Miyazaki’s selflessness was conspicuous. It was a 
prerequisite for Miyazaki to kill his ego in order to climb up the ladder to presidency. 
Consequently, he has lost himself.”60 In fact, Miyazaki was the man second in command. 
     The founder of the Dai-Ichi Bank, the oldest commercial bank in Japan, was Eiichi 
Shibusawa who had advocated “the Rongo (the Analects of Confucius) and an abacus which 
means that Japanese style capitalism should go with the Analects of Confucius. 61 Inoue 
himself, however, made use of anti-social force positively and Miyazaki and others in the 
management made enormous amounts of anti-social loans to the Sokaiya. This April the name 
of the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank disappeared because of merging with the Fuji and the Industrial 
Bank of Japan into Mizuho Financial Group. On April 1, the system errors resulted in 2.5 
million cases of delays of withdrawal and cash transfers. 62 The troubles lasted until early 
May. On June 25, the shareholdings’ meeting was held and 1,790 shareholders attended, 
accusing the malfunctions of the system and the irresponsible attitude of the top management. 
The meeting was closed unsatisfactorily for the shareholders after one hour fifty six minutes 
because Terunobu Maeda, President, Mizuho Holding did not express his resignation and 
there were some shareholders still wishing to question but rejected by “Iginashi (no 
objections)” voiced by those employees who sat in the front rows of the hall in the Tokyo 




     The cross-shareholding arrangement between main banks and their custome rs was 
created after the dissolution of the Zaibatsu. This arrangement developed further with the 
liberalization of the capital market in Japan and by issuing common stocks at the current 
market price. This arrangement together with the lifetime employment mores, seniority 
system, and cooperative company-wide labor union made Japan the big economy second to 
US. Without outside criticism, the Japanese management had devoted to increasing 
investment in equipment and getting a greater share in each market. Main banks and major 
security firms had been of great help in financing them. If any shareholders had asked them 
to raise up ROE, the high economic growth of the Japanese economy would have not been 
realized.  
     The bubble economy of the 1980’s, however, was also the result of the 
cross-shareholding arrangement because the common stock issuing at the current market 
price under the prevalence of the cross-shareholding had tended to increase too much. The 
capital-adequacy requirement for banks doing international business introduced at the Basle 
Committee on July 15, 1988 was also of help to the Japanese banks to extend loans overseas. 
After the bubble burst on October 1,1990, however, the Japanese banks and corporations 
have been in trouble more than ten years. This is because almost all banks and their clients 
have been afflicted with “cross-bad shares” holdings. 
     According to business results released by major banking groups on May 24, the 
aggregate net losses came to ¥4.1 trillion. The major banking groups wrote off a total of ¥7.8 
trillion of bad loans in the last fiscal year, while ¥9.7 trillion worth of loans on their balance 
sheets turned non-performing in the same period. The major banks still carried a total of 
about ¥5.9 trillion of bad loans as of the end of March (Table 4). In fact, unwinding of 
cross-shareholdings happened already. After steady building up their mutual equity holdings 
between World War?  and the end of the 1980s, Japanese corporations began to unwind 
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some of their cross-shareholdings in the early 1990s. As indicated already, 
cross-shareholdings among six enterprise groups which had accounted for 12.10% from 1987 
to 7.47% (Unit : amounts of the value of stock). 
     In this respect, on January 29, 2002 the Banks Shareholdings Purchase Corporation64 
was established to purchase banks shareholdings at the current prices of the stock market. 
This will help because if and when a loss is incurred due to the difference between stock 
prices bought and stock prices at the time of liquidation, then up to 2 trillion yen in public 
funds will be spent to make up for it. The government is aiming to restrict bank shareholdings 
to the level that is equal to their Tier? Capital by September 2004. Consequently, major 
banks are thought to be planning to sell their shareholdings amounting to about 5 trillion yen 
by March 2003. 65 Moreover, with companies now allowed to buy back their own shares and 
hold them without a specific purpose,66 a large number of companies set new ceilings on the 
practice.67  
     It is difficult and almost impossible to change at once the mental climate in Japan, that 
is to say, lack of individualism in general and the absence of responsibility among the top in 
the Japanese management in particular. Hence, it is our pressing need to change the 
institutional arrangements, the most important one of which is the stable cross-shareholding 
arrangement should be abolished because the cross-shareholding is against the principle of a 
joint stock company and make Japanese banks ’ management dependent on the vicissitudes of 
the stock market. The above-mentioned recent measures by the government are just of 
temporary character. Fundamentally, the following measures should be taken so that Japan 
may avoid the recurrence of the unprecedented boom (the bubble) and the extra - ordinary 
burst.  
     First, banks should be prohibited entirely from owning the shares of the corporations. 
This is because a main bank at the center of each enterprise group holds each other shares of 
its clients customers, and they exchange t heir letters of attorney for each of their 
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shareholders’ meetings and consequently neglect the rights of other shareholders who own 
shares. But the representative of a bank or its customer sometimes does not have a share by 
himself. This is managerial control based on corporate shareholders.  
     Furthermore, main bank A is able to own shares of company B up to 5% of B’s total 
outstanding stock (Article 11. Anti-Monopoly Law) and also own shares of company C up to 
5% of C’s total outstanding stock and so on. As a result, bank A holds enormous amounts of 
shares of company B, C and so on. And the Japanese banks are allowed to count up to 45% of 
the unrealized gain on securities and other equities as part of base capital in the Basle 
Capital-adequacy requirements for banks doing international business. Consequently, 
Japanese banks’ management is dependent on the stock market and it makes Japanese banks’ 
management unstable and shaky. 
     Second, voting rights of the corporations should not be permitted, because big 
shareholders exchange their letters of attorney for each of their shareholders’ meetings and 
consequently, neglect the rights of individual shareholders. This view was expressed by F. A. 
Hayek. By allowing corporations to have voting right in other corporations of which they 
own shares, F. A. Hayek says : 
 
     The corporation thereby becomes, instead of an association of partners with a common 
interest, an association of groups whose interest may be in strong conflict ; and the 
possibility appears that a group which directly owns assets amounting only to a small 
fraction of those of the corporation, may, through a pyramiding of holdings, acquire 
control of assets amounting to a multiple of what they own themselves. By owning a 
controlling interest in a corporation which owns a controlling interest in another 
corporation and so on, a comparatively small amount owned by a person or group may 
control a very much bigger aggregation of capital. There seems to me to exist no 
reason why a corporation should not be allowed to own stock of another corporation 
purely as an investment. But it also seems to me that such stock, so long as it is owned 
by another corporation, should cease to confer a right to vote.68  
     Third, more adequate disclosure on information of the corporation should be available.  
 34 
 
It is a well-known fact that Adam Smith (1723-90), author of the Wealth of Nations (1776), 
was against the establishment of a joint-stock company. But, later John Stuart Mill (1806-73), 
author of Principles of Political Economy (1848), supported the establishment of a joint-stock 
company. He, however, noted that such laws [relating to the establishment of a joint-stock 
company] should require from all joint-stock associations with limited responsibilities that 
the amount of capital on which they profess to carry on business should either be actually 
paid up or security for it should be given. Such accounts, he argued, should be kept accessible 
to individuals because it allows one to ascertain at any time the existing state of the 
company’s affairs. Hence, Mill argues, it allows one to learn whether the capital, which is the 
sole security for many engagements into which they enter, still subsists unimpaired, and also 
impresses upon one the sense in which the fidelity of these accounts being guarded by 
sufficient penalties.69  
     From this standpoint, the disclosure by Japanese corporations is not enough. Enhancing 
transparency of Keiretsu  relationships through a number of legal amendments to strengthen 
disclosure requirements were enacted and implemented by April 1991. The Japanese 
Government also enacted legislation in May 1992 increasing the penalties (up to one year in 
jail or a ¥1 million fine) for inadequate or fraudulent disclosure. But, for example, the 
disclosure (126 pages) on September 17, 1997 by the DKB that contains the anti-social loans 
to Ryuichi Koike, a Sokaiya was very unclear.  
     As a result of unwinding of the cross-shareholdings among banks and their client 
corporations, individual shareholders and foreign shareholders bought shares and the 
percentage of shares of publicly traded Japanese companies in the hands of Individuals and 
foreign investors had swelled to 19.7% and 18.3% respectively as of the end of March 
2002.70 This changing composition of share-ownership has started to alter the scene. 
Japanese corporations will have to pay more attention to disclosure and investors relations. 
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The revision of the Commercial Code which will be effective in April 2003, may have begun 
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